The Basilicata Wealth Fund: resource policy and long-run economic development in Southern Italy by Iacono, Roberto
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Basilicata Wealth Fund: resource
policy and long-run economic
development in Southern Italy
Roberto Iacono
Sør-Trøndelag University College (HiST)
1. September 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66393/
MPRA Paper No. 66393, posted 2. September 2015 07:08 UTC
The Basilicata Wealth Fund: resource policy
and long-run economic development in
Southern Italy
Roberto Iacono
September 1, 2015
Abstract
This paper contributes to the growing political economy literature
of within-country natural resources management, by proposing a new
resource policy for the oil-rich southern Italian region of Basilicata.
The policy proposal is to establish a (regional) wealth fund in which
all the royalty revenues from non-renewable natural resource exploita-
tion in Basilicata would be stored and fully converted into low-risk
nancial assets. The scope is to give priority to long-run investments
as to better exploit revenues from large-scale extraction of natural
capital. Establishing a wealth fund at the regional sub-national level
is a novel approach that can be applied to other resource-rich regions
in the world. I label the fund as the Basilicata Wealth Fund (BWF).
The BWF would be a regionally owned investment fund, however inde-
pendently administered from national authorities (for instance, as an
independent legal entity under the jurisdiction of the Bank of Italy).
In addition, the paper posits a transparent and clear-cut spending s-
cal rule in order to let regional authorities use the resource revenues to
nance economic policy. The clear advantage from the BWF would be
the stronger focus on long-run economic development and the higher
accountability, hence avoiding misuse of resource revenues for myopic
scal spending.
Sør-Trøndelag University College (HiST), Department of Applied Social Science, Post-
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to put forward a new economic policy approach
for the resource-rich southern Italian region of Basilicata, which can also
be adopted from other resource-rich regions or federal states in the world.
In other words, this paper aims at contributing to the growing literature of
within-country political economy of natural resources, recently surveyed by
Cust and Poelhekke (2015).
The recent empirical studies of Percoco (2012), Rocchi et al. (2015),
Iacono (2015) and Biasi (2015), all point in the direction of missing or negli-
gible positive e¤ects from oil extraction activity in Basilicata. Percoco (2012)
exploits a geographical Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in order to
obtain the causal e¤ects of almost two decades (1991 2008) of large-scale oil
extraction on per capita extra enterprise creation. The results show a positive
e¤ect of 0; 01 per capita extra rms, connected to a rather modest increase
in employment of 2500 labour units. Complementary to the study of Percoco
(2012), the quantitative comparative case study by Iacono (2015) estimates
the general equilibrium e¤ects of oil extraction activity and royalty revenues
(1980  2009) on the Basilicata regional economy. Iacono (2015) implements
the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) in order to construct a data-driven
comparison unit to the treated region of Basilicata, and conrms that the
causal e¤ects on a set of regional macroeconomic variables (real GDP per
capita, employment rates and gross xed investments) are negligible. Rocchi
et al. (2015) construct a multi-sector model of the Basilicata region built
on a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), in order to analyze the potential im-
pact on regional development (on both economic growth and distributive
aspects) of the allocation of royalty revenues (1997   2010). Rocchi et al.
(2015) conclude that a more productive use of resource revenues at the level
of regional government might have resulted in stronger regional growth and
higher employment rates. Another recent study by Biasi (2015) provides an
estimation of the genuine savings dynamics for the region of Basilicata as
compared to other regions of Italy, showing clearly that extraction of nat-
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ural capital combined with unproductive revenue spending diminishes the
overall sustainability of the process of regional economic development. To
sum up, all these empirical studies converge on the conclusion that the past
allocation of royalty revenues, mostly allocated to short-run social spending
in these rst couple of decades of resource exploitation, has been detrimental
to the economic development of the region.
Hence, the consensus which emerges from these empirical studies calls for
a brand new economic policy approach in order to give priority to long-run
investments and to better exploit revenues from extraction of natural capital.
The rst and main contribution of this paper is to put forward and analyze
such an approach. The policy proposal is to establish a (regional) sovereign
wealth fund in which all the royalty revenues from non-renewable natural
resource exploitation in Basilicata would be stored and fully converted into
low-risk nancial assets. For the sake of simplicity and in order to be consis-
tent with the title of this paper, I will label the fund as the Basilicata Wealth
Fund (BWF, hereafter). The BWF would be a regionally owned investment
fund, however independently administered from national authorities (for in-
stance, as an independent legal entity under the jurisdiction of the Bank of
Italy)1. This institutional framework does not substantially deviate from the
current institutional framework, in which the region of Basilicata receives the
100% of the royalty revenues paid from extracting companies to the Italian
State (Iacono, 2015).
In addition, a transparent and clear-cut spending scal rule should be
designed in order to let regional authorities use the resource revenues to -
nance economic development objectives. The simplest benchmark scal rule
could be such that, for each given year, the regional government is allowed to
use the annuity value of the nancial wealth accumulated in the BWF. De-
viations from this straightforward rule might also be conceived, for instance
allowing larger spending in di¢ cult times, as for example the Chilean scal
rule does (Marcel et al., 2001). The clear advantage from the BWF and from
a transparent scal spending rule would be the stronger focus on long-run
economic development and the higher accountability (hence avoiding misuse
of resource revenues for myopic scal spending). An additional novelty aspect
of the economic policy approach proposed in this paper, is that establishing
1To the best of my knowledge, the only research conducted on the creation of regionally
owned funds has been conducted by Braunn-Munzinger (2009), who analyzed how these
funds can help to implement the EU and European member statesAid for Trade (AfT)
commitments.
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a wealth fund at the regional level has not been tried before and could be
considered as a new policy option for other resource-rich regions in the world.
That being said, let me state once again that the main scope of this paper
is to put forward and analytically present the core theoretical features of this
new approach for the exploitation of resource revenues. In other words, this
work is neither aimed at econometrically forecasting the economic e¤ects
of this approach, nor it is aimed at pinning down the precise institutional
framework in which this policy proposal should land2. Both of these analyses
would be destined to future research.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces the theory and prac-
tice of sovereign wealth funds, section 3 applies the analytical framework to
the case of the Basilicata region, whilst section 4 concludes.
2 Sovereign Wealth Funds: theory and prac-
tices
The aim of this section is to analyze more in detail the policy of establish-
ing a Basilicata Wealth Fund. At rst, the benchmark analytical model
will be presented, by pinning down the scal spending rule formulation and
the resulting fund dynamics. In addition, the following subsection presents
a relevant example of a sovereign wealth fund established in resource-rich
countries.
2.1 The analytical framework
The main scope behind a wealth fund is to boost the long-run impact of
current resource revenues. In other words, the wealth fund postpones the use
of the resource revenues by smoothing their spending path. Let us describe
the features of the analytical framework behind the wealth fund, similarly to
the model developed in Iacono (2012).
The BWFwould for instance prescribe that the entire income from royalty
revenues for a given year Rt (with RT = 0 due to resource depletion at t = T )
be stored and converted into low-risk nancial assets (r is the constant net
interest rate). Dening as Abwft the amount of resource wealth allocated in
2For a detailed operational "roadmap" in order to analyze when and how setting up a
sovereign wealth fund, see Ang (2010) and Das et al. (2009).
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the BWF, it gives the following fund dynamics in discrete time:
Abwft+1 = (1 + r)
h
Abwft +Rt   gbwft
i
; (1)
in which gbwft is the regional government scal spending rule. The simplest
stylized formulation of the scal spending rule is the following:
gbwft =

r
1 + r

Abwft ; (2)
in which
 
r
1+r

Abwft represents the annuity value of the nancial wealth ac-
cumulated in the BWF; i.e., the regional government would be allowed to
consume only the return on nancial wealth which has been previously in-
vested. The scal spending rule in (2) draws heavily on the actual Norwegian
spending rule linked to the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund (Harding and
van der Ploeg, 2013). It is relevant to remind that deviations from the rather
conservative benchmark scal spending rule gbwft can be agreed, in order to
allow higher spending at times.
As opposed to that, the current scal spending rule of the regional gov-
ernment of Basilicata is basically given by:
gt = Rt: (3)
A rst clear advantage of the scal spending rule given in (2) with respect
to the actual spending rule in (3), is that once exhaustible resources are
depleted at t = T (and hence, RT = 0), regional government expenditure
will still be positive due to previously accumulated nancial wealth:
gbwfT > gT = RT = 0: (4)
The clear-cut formulation of the scal spending rule gbwft in (2) was chosen
as well in order to enhance analytical tractability: gbwft can be now inserted
back into (1) in order to get:
Abwft+1 = (1 + r)

Abwft +Rt  

r
1 + r

Abwft

; (5)
Abwft+1 = A
bwf
t + (1 + r)Rt: (6)
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For the sake of completeness, I will now solve the di¤erence equation
given in (6), which gives:
Abwft = A
bwf
0 + (1 + r)
t 1X
s=0
Rs: (7)
As it can be seen from (7), in the post-depletion period we have AbwfT+s =
AbwfT , with (s = 1; ::; n), due to RT = 0. By substituting the last result
from (7) back into the BWF spending rule (2), we obtain a formulation of
the scal spending rule gbwft which is a function of exclusively exogenous
terms, precisely the entire stream of royalty revenues
Pt 1
s=0Rs and the initial
condition for the wealth fund given by Abwf0 :
gbwft =
r
1 + r
"
(1 + r)
t 1X
s=0
Rs + A
bwf
0
#
: (8)
In conclusion, the main feature of the BWF spending rules exemplied
in (2, 8) is that scal spending at time t is no longer strictly depending on
the uncertain stream of resource revenues deriving from royalty payments.
In other words, current scal spending will be now a fraction of the size of
the nancial wealth Abwft previously accumulated in the BWF.
2.2 Wealth fundspractices: the Norwegian experience
Due to the fact that there are no examples of sovereign wealth fund at the
sub-national level, this subsection focuses on a relevant country case study.
The relevancy of a national sovereign wealth fund case study for the resource
policy proposal of this paper relies on the possibility that such a national
framework be translated to a within-country institutional setting. In addi-
tion, a high degree of transparency would be desirable. Hence, the Norwegian
experience will be given a prominent role in this subsection, as a benchmark
framework in order to highlight the practices of establishing and running a
sovereign wealth fund. The Norwegian experience with management of pe-
troleum resources and more precisely the history of the Government Pension
Fund Global (GPFG) has been analyzed by Caner and Gresses (2010), Hard-
ing and van der Ploeg (2013) and Holden (2013). The proposal of establishing
a wealth fund in order to store resource revenues for future generations of cit-
izens dates back as far as 1983, when the "Tempo Utvalg" (which stands for
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"Speed Committee" in Norwegian, referred to the velocity of the extraction
process). However, it took more a decade of parliamentary debate before
the fund was actually established, in 1996. The establishment of a regional
wealth fund at the sub-national level in Italy might partially borrow from the
Norwegian experience, however it is important to point out that a new insti-
tutional framework should be designed, tailored to the new within-country
context. As the Norwegian wealth fund is a state owned fund independently
administered by the Norwegian central bank, the BWF could be established
as a regionally owned fund independently administered by the central bank
of Italy, under a specic and transparent regulatory framework. This institu-
tional framework does not di¤er substantially from the current institutional
framework, in which the region of Basilicata receives from the Italian state
the 100% of the royalty revenues paid from extracting companies on the value
of the oil extracted (Iacono, 2015).
At the beginning, the Norwegian wealth fund did not comprise an ad hoc
spending rule, hence the national government was spending ahead of both
current and future oil revenues (this consumption pattern can be theoreti-
cally justied by the Permanent Income Hypothesis, as developed in Iacono,
2012). In 2001, the ad hoc scal spending rule based on the annuity value
of the nancial wealth allocated in the fund was introduced, and since then
Norwegian government authorities have been roughly spending each year a
4% of the funds accumulated wealth. The size of the fund was approxi-
mately 290% of the Norwegian GDP at the end of 2014 (NBIM, 2014). The
previous section has proposed for the BWF a scal spending rule based on
the Norwegian experience, although the interest rate determining the annu-
ity value should be tailored to the size of the BWF and to the necessity of
the Basilicata region.
In conclusion, some political economy considerations. The economics lit-
erature on the management of natural resources (surveyed in Deacon, 2012)
has clearly indicated that the e¢ cacy of the use of resource windfalls depends
crucially on the quality of institutions. For instance, lack of strong institu-
tions can lead to higher corruption, as in Brollo et al. (2013), and determine
a sub-optimal exploitation of the resource windfalls. To a certain extent, the
establishment of the BWF responds precisely to the need of avoiding that
the quality of the local institutions and the regional authorities in power will
inuence the spending path of the royalty revenues. On the other hand, the
quality of institutions at the national level still plays a key role when it comes
to designing the BWF, pinning down the rules of the game and ultimately
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administrating the BWF.
3 The Basilicata Wealth Fund
This section aims at showing how the BWF would function in practice, by
calibrating the analytical framework described above in (1-8) to the actual
series of royalty revenues received from the Basilicata region, from 1997 to
2014. Once the series for the fund dynamics from (6) has been simulated
inserting the actual series of royalty revenues Rt (1997   2014), it will be
possible to numerically compare the consumption series for both the actual
spending rule (3) and the BWF spending rule (2).
Let us start the reduced form simulation exercise by doing some parame-
terization. The constant net interest rate is assumed to be r = 0:02, which
is a realistic value taking into account the BWFs administration costs and
ination. The actual royalty revenue series transferred from the Italian state
to the Basilicata region for the period 1997   2014 has been retrieved from
UNMIG3. In order to show the di¤erent dynamics for the two scal spending
rules in the post-depletion era, it is assumed for simplicity that resource de-
pletion happens at T = 2015. The full time range of the simulation exercise
is 1997  2050, hence including both a pre- and post-depletion period.
At rst, let us plot the time series for the actual scal spending rule
gt = Rt, which closely reects the actual royalty revenues Rt (Euros, current
prices):
3Royalties transfers in Euros were provided by UNMIG (Italian Ministry of Economic
Development, General Direction for Energy and Mineral resources) and are available
online at http://unmig.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/. These data were downloaded on the
25=8=2015.
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Figure 1 - Regional scal spending based on actual royalty revenues,
1997  2020.
As it can be seen from Figure 1, the highly volatile series of the actual
royalty revenues increase substantially from the end of the 1990s, up until the
assumed depletion year 2015. From T = 2015 onwards, scal consumption for
the regional government falls to zero as a consequence of depleted resources
and null royalty revenues.
The next step is simulating the series Abwft for the BWF as given in the
reduced form shown in (6), which is a function of actual royalty revenues Rt
and which incorporates the scal spending rule gbwft given in (2)
4. The time
series for the BWF can be plotted as follows:
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Figure 2 - Financial wealth accumulated in the BWF, 1997  2020
4Data from simulation are available from the author on request.
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As it is shown in Figure 2, allocation of royalty revenues to the BWF
drives the exponential growth of nancial wealth accumulated in Abwft up
until the depletion year, from which the amount of wealth accumulated stays
constant (as predicted in section 2:1). This is due to the fact that the rather
conservative scal spending rule gbwft does not imply higher consumption
than the annuity value of the funds nancial wealth. In other words, it is
crucial to point out that a deviation from such a rule in the sense of higher
consumption would imply a atter accumulation of nancial wealth in the
BWF.
The last step of this simulation exercise is to jointly plot the two scal
spending series given by the actual spending rule (3) from Figure 1 and the
BWF spending rule (2), in order to visualize the gap in consumption between
them. The resulting gure is:
0
50
00
00
00
1.
00
0e
+0
8
1.
50
0e
+0
8
2.
00
0e
+0
8
R
eg
io
na
l F
is
ca
l S
pe
nd
in
g,
 E
ur
os
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Year
G BWF G t
Figure 3 - Fiscal spending rules in comparison, 1997  2050.
The joint plot of Figure 3 presents the main result of this simulation
exercise, which intends to show the gap between the di¤erent consumption
dynamics emerging from the actual spending rule and the one based on the
BWF. As mentioned above, it has to be pointed out that the simulation
results highly depend on the parameterization of the model, for instance on
the level of the constant net interest rate r.
In conclusion, the intention of this simulation exercise was to present an
analytical approximation of how the BWF would allow the regional govern-
ment of Basilicata to smooth consumption of the royalty revenues towards
long-run economic development objectives.
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4 Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper was to propose a new resource policy for the oil-rich
southern Italian region of Basilicata. The policy proposal developed is to
establish a regional wealth fund in order to store all the royalty revenues from
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources in Basilicata. In addition, the
paper posited a transparent and clear-cut spending scal rule, which aims
at fostering the long-run impact of resource revenues. Deviations from the
straightforward rule put forward in the analysis of this work might also be
conceived, for instance allowing larger spending in recession times.
The greatest advantage from the BWF and from an attached transparent
scal spending rule would be the stronger focus on long-run economic de-
velopment and the higher political accountability, hence avoiding misuse of
resource revenues for myopic scal spending. An additional novelty aspect of
the resource policy proposed in this paper, is that establishing a regionally
owned wealth fund administered by national authorities could be considered
as an additional policy option for other resource-rich regions (and federal
states) in the world.
Further research on this issue could be done by conducting a welfare-
based evaluation of the consumption gap between the two scal rules, and
calibrating the simulation exercise even closer to the actual prole of the
Basilicata economy, in order to forecast the impact of the BWF on the eco-
nomic development of the region.
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